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Moral Demands and Not Doing the Best One Can 
 
The problem of extreme demands is one of the most intractable in 
contemporary moral theory.  On the one hand, it seems that a failure to 
prevent great suffering at little cost to ourselves is morally wrong; given 
the amount of suffering in the world and the comparatively trivial nature 
of the requisite sacrifices, this intuition demands that we give up quite a 
lot.  On the other hand, it doesn’t seem to us that we act wrongly in 
living lives characterised by only moderate sacrifice, in which our time 
and resources are disproportionately used to benefit ourselves and those 
close to us.  These two intuitions are extremely difficult to reconcile 
within any moral theory that recognises a duty to promote the general 
good.  In this paper, however, I will suggest one possible way of doing so.  
My suggestion requires taking a closer look at the way in which the 
demand to the promote the good is derived: specifically, at the way our 
option set is characterised and the information that we take into account 
in weighing these options.  I will suggest that there are certain 
assumptions it is plausible to make regarding the relevance of 
information about our own and other agents’ actions, and that once 
these assumptions are made, we can see how permissions may be 
derived within the framework of good-promotion. 
 
1.  The Problem of Extreme Demands 
 
Since the problem of Extreme Demands is well known, I do not intend to 
spell it out here.  I will, however, briefly outline the assumptions and 
framework I will be using in this paper.  Firstly, I will be discussing only 
so-called demands of beneficence – that is, demands that we contribute 
to the welfare of other agents.  Although some philosophers have pointed 
out the need to address the potential for equally extreme demands 
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arising from duties and rights, this is beyond the scope of the present 
paper.1  Secondly, I am assuming that the demands of beneficence take 
the form of a pro tanto reason to promote (neutral) value: specifically, the 
value of human welfare.2  Given the state of the world, promoting the 
welfare of others requires me to make very large sacrifices in terms of my 
own welfare.  Our commonsense moral intuitions, however, tell us that 
such sacrifices, while morally admirable, are not required of us.  In fact it 
is morally permissible (that is, neither morally required nor morally 
prohibited) for me to favour my own interests to a very significant extent. 
 
The problem of extreme demands is therefore that of finding room, within 
a neutral-value-promoting framework, for a permission to choose options 
that are less than the best available to us.  Although a certain amount of 
sacrifice may be morally required in order to promote the good of others, 
this cannot rise beyond a relatively moderate level: for example, that 
which would be my fair share of a sufficient contribution when 
distributed amongst all agents to whom the demand applies.  Beyond 
this, a plausible moral theory will neither require nor prohibit anything: 
agents will be permitted either to devote their left-over time and 
resources to their own welfare, or to make extra contributions to 
compensate for the non-compliance of others. 
 
A third assumption, which is perhaps more controversial, is that the 
problem of extreme demands – and hence, any solution – will arise in the 
context of decisions that have fairly wide scope: that is, decisions about 
what kind of life I am going to try to live, or what level of regular 
                                       
1 I believe, however, that the account I develop here may contain the resources to give 
such an explanation. 
2 By neutral value, I mean value which is not relativised to agents (e.g., the value of my 
welfare) or to times (the value of present welfare). 
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contributions to the worse off I will commit myself to, rather than 
individual decisions such as, for example, whether to use the three 
dollars in my hand to buy a cup of coffee or donate it to charity.  The 
kind of permission I am looking for, then, is a permission to choose to 
live a life characterised by moderate sacrifice, in which I exhibit 
disproportionate partiality towards my own projects, and towards those 
with whom I have a close personal relationship.  Whether permissions in 
individual choice situations (what should I do with these three dollars?) 
follow from a permission to live a life of moderate sacrifice is a subject for 
another paper. 
 
2.  Options and Outcomes 
 
I am therefore concerned with a choice situation about the level of 
demands to which I ought to commit myself.  I might choose to commit 
myself to a life of extreme sacrifice, giving up most of my projects and 
any personal relationships that would require disproportionate partiality.  
Or I might choose to use my resources to live an ordinary life, in which I 
maintain personal projects and relationships, thus contributing only a 
modest amount of my resources to the welfare of others.  From the point 
of view of demands to promote the good, it seems obvious which I should 
choose; no plausible argument can be made for thinking that the neutral 
value of my projects and relationships – that is, their contribution to 
general welfare – comes close to the value that would be realised if the 
resources used to sustain them were instead devoted to improving the 
welfare of the worst off people in the world. 
 
One thing to note, however, is that the choices have been described in a 
way that assumes particular outcomes for each.  In particular, it is 
assumed that whatever kind of life, or course of action I commit myself 
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to, I will follow through on that commitment.  But this is not a realistic 
way to describe my actual choice situation.  Of course, if I commit myself 
to a particular course of action, it is at least possible for me to follow 
through, and I make the commitment in the expectation or hope that I 
will do just that.  But this is by no means a certainty, even if we ignore 
the trivial fact that my circumstances could be altered by factors beyond 
my control (for example, my being run over by a bus before I donate any 
money to charity).  More importantly, whether my present choice has the 
specified outcome depends upon my own future actions – in later choice 
situations, I have to choose in a manner appropriate to my earlier 
decision.  Thus, whatever choice I make now, there is in fact a range of 
possible outcomes depending upon what choices I make subsequent to 
the initial choice. 
 
How should the fact of a range of possible outcomes inform my choice 
between options? The two main positions on this question are commonly 
referred to as Actualism and Possibilism.  Possibilism holds that, of a set 
of options, the best (and hence the right) one is the one that has the best 
possible outcome.  Actualism, on the other hand, determines the value of 
each option by reference to the outcome that would actually occur were 
that option to be chosen; hence, the best option is the one with the best 
actual outcome.3  Clearly, the two will deliver different judgements in 
cases where the actual outcome of choosing an option will not be the 
best possible outcome of choosing that option. 
 
In the case of demandingness, we can assume that the best possible 
outcome of my making a commitment to a life of sacrifice is that I 
                                       
3 These definitions are given in Frank Jackson and Robert Pargetter, “Oughts, Options 
and Actualism,” The Philosophical Review vol.95 no.2 (April 1986), 233. 
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successfully follow through on that commitment; although my own 
welfare is significantly lower as a result, the amount of general welfare I 
produce is significantly higher.  But we can suppose that, if I am like 
most other people, what will actually happen subsequent to my making 
such a commitment is that I will fail to live up to it; following a great deal 
of suffering and guilt on my part, and perhaps irreparable damage to my 
projects and relationships, I would make only a modest contribution.  
The best possible outcome of my making a commitment to the modest 
standard, however, is far closer to what would be the actual outcome: I 
would succeed in following through on that commitment (say, doing my 
fair share), while maintaining my own welfare at a higher level. 
 
If I am choosing on the basis of the best possible outcome, then the best 
possible outcome of a commitment to a life of sacrifice (a significant 
contribution to the general welfare) is better than the best possible 
outcome of a commitment to doing my share (a modest contribution to 
the general welfare); thus, it seems that I ought to make the former 
commitment.  But of the outcomes that will actually result from my 
choice of each option, that associated with doing my share (a modest 
contribution with higher welfare for myself) seems better than the 
outcome associated with the life of extreme sacrifice (a modest 
contribution with a significant amount of damage to my welfare); 
therefore, I ought to adopt the latter option. 
 
The question, then, is whether it is legitimate to allow my choice to be 
influenced by my prediction that I will act in a certain way subsequent to 
choosing, or whether the only thing that should be relevant is what I can 
do subsequent to choosing.  According to Possibilists, if I can bring about 
the best possible outcome – if I do not expect that I will be rendered 
incapable of responding to my reasons in my subsequent choice 
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situations – then it is not appropriate for me to base my current choice 
on a prediction that I will in fact fail to respond to them.  To choose in 
this way is to fail to treat oneself as an agent.  According to Actualists, 
however, to fixate upon the best possible outcome regardless of the fact 
that it will not in fact happen is arbitrary and irrational, especially when 
this also means ignoring the likelihood that this choice will in fact bring 
about the worst possible outcome.  I will have something to say about 
this debate later on.  First, however, I would like to examine the two 
positions in the context of the demands of beneficence. 
 
3.  Possibilism, Moral Demands, and the Agency of Others 
 
If, in a value-promoting framework, I ought to choose the option with the 
best possible outcome, then promoting the good apparently requires me 
to commit to a very demanding standard.  As an agent – that is, as 
someone who has the capacity to respond to reasons, and who is aware 
that I possess that capacity – I cannot, when deliberating about my 
choices, make a decision based upon an assumption that I will not 
actually respond to those reasons.  I am therefore not permitted to 
choose a course of action in which I maintain my projects and 
attachments, if I can meet a more demanding standard. 
 
The claim that extreme sacrifice has the best possible outcome is made 
on the basis of a number of background facts.  Some of these – the fact 
that many people have an unacceptably low standard of living, and that 
large contributions from the affluent can increase their welfare by far 
more than they decrease the welfare of the contributors – ought to be 
uncontroversial; at any rate, they will not be in question here.  However, 
another important background fact is an assumption about the non-
compliance of other agents.  The demand to promote general welfare is 
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addressed to any agent who is in a position to do so; if every such agent 
in fact responded appropriately, the demands on any individual agent 
would be far less extreme (or at least, it would be much harder to object 
to them).  Intolerably extreme demands arise in part because the vast 
majority of other agents are not meeting their obligations. 
 
But if it is illegitimate for me to allow assumptions about my future 
actions to enter my deliberations – and the reason for this is that such 
assumptions involve a denial of my own agency – then the claim might 
also be made that it is inappropriate to make assumptions about the 
actions of other agents in making my choices.  If the fact that I am 
capable of responding to my reasons rules out my choosing on the basis 
that I won’t respond to my reasons, then doesn’t the fact that others are 
capable of responding to their reasons similarly rule out my choosing on 
the basis that they won’t do so? 
 
If, in making my calculation, I must disregard any information about 
what other agents will do as well as information about what I will do, 
then the picture changes significantly.  In this case, the best possible 
outcome of my doing just my share is that I succeed in following 
through, and all other agents do as well.  The best possible outcome of 
my adopting a life of extreme sacrifice, on the other hand, is that I 
succeed in following through, and that others also do at least their share.  
And the latter outcome seems worse in at least one respect than the 
former: that is, my welfare is significantly affected in the latter.  Thus, 
adopting a life of extreme sacrifice, whatever its actual consequences, will 
not produce the best possible option.  It may appear, then, that although 
one aspect of Possibilism pushes in the direction of extreme demands, 
the other pulls away from it. 
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An argument similar to that above has been made by L.J. Cohen.4  And 
as Humberstone points out, this position seems initially appealing, due 
to “its refusal to let those who can and should pay ‘off the hook’ by 
regarding others as obliged to act, in effect, as if the non-payers were not 
there at all.  It seems crucial that the defaulters are in fact 
psychologically capable of contributing.”5  However, it is not in fact a 
plausible position.  Humberstone’s objection is that “to plump for the 
action which yields the best world only together with actions on the part 
of others which they will in fact not perform is typically to act less well 
than one might, given one’s circumstances.”6  In other words, it seems 
intuitively obvious that we ought to take into account what other agents 
will do when deliberating about what we ought to do. 
 
This intuition exists in the case of requirements to promote the good as 
well, as can be seen by considering a simple example.  Suppose that 
there are two victims drowning in a lake, and there are two people in the 
vicinity, each aware of the victims’ plight and capable of performing the 
rescues.  The best possible outcome is clearly for each person to rescue 
one victim: it is fairer, there is less risk to each person from overexertion, 
and the victims are rescued more quickly. But it would be absurd to 
claim that the first rescuer ought to ignore the other’s inaction and 
rescue only one victim, on the grounds that this is the option associated 
with the best possible outcome. 
 
                                       
4 L.J. Cohen, “Who is Starving Whom?” Theoria.  The interpretation in terms of the 
actualism/possibilism debate is made by Lloyd Humberstone, “The Background of 
Circumstances,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly vol. 64 (1983): 19-34. 
5 Humberstone, “The Background of Circumstances,” 28. 
6 Humberstone, “The Background of Circumstances,” 28 
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The notion that we ought to ignore what others will actually do might be 
defended at this point by the argument that in this case, the outcomes 
are not merely probable but certain.  If I do not rescue the second victim, 
they will die; there is no longer any possibility of the outcome in which 
the other person performs the second rescue.  If the other would-be 
rescuer refuses to do their part, then I am justified in discarding that 
possibility from the set of possible outcomes.  The best possible outcome 
then becomes the one in which I rescue both victims, and I therefore 
ought to do that. 
 
The problem with this reply is that such a standard, if sufficient to 
deliver the desired result in the rescue case, will almost certainly also 
lead to extreme demands to promote the good generally.  If the other 
potential rescuer’s inaction thus far is enough to negate the possibility of 
their acting in the rescue case, then the inaction of others thus far in the 
face of global poverty is also sufficient to negate the possibility that they 
will suddenly now do their share to alleviate it.  And this will lead back to 
extreme demands: I will have to take the inaction of others into account 
and commit myself to the course of action with the best possible outcome 
given that assumption. 
 
In any case, however, this approach is not going to deliver permissions.  
Although the moral rightness of the choice to live a life of only modest 
sacrifice would fall out of an account which allowed assumptions about 
what other agents were going to do, this would be a requirement to live 
such a life, not a permission.  Even more counterintuitively, making 
more than the modest sacrifice will be prohibited, since doing this will be 
incompatible with the realisation of the best possible outcome. 
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4.  Actualism and Extreme Demands 
 
We have seen that it is intuitively appropriate for me to consider what 
other agents will do in deliberating about my options.  But what about 
considering what I am actually going to do?  As noted, assuming that 
other agents will not comply with demands of beneficence leads to 
extreme demands for myself.  However, if I  will not follow through on a 
commitment to meet such demands, then perhaps this also ought to 
influence my choice.  As Frank Jackson notes, “some actions are such 
that they only have good results if they are followed up in the right way . 
. . . In all these cases it is better not to start if you are not going to follow 
up in an appropriate way.”7  So if I will not follow through on any 
commitment to live a life of extreme sacrifice, and if it is appropriate for 
me to consider this in my deliberation, then I ought to adopt some choice 
that will have better actual results. 
 
Unlike the case of other agents, however, it is not so obvious that my 
own subsequent actions should influence my choice.  If these 
subsequent actions are under my control and if I am capable of 
responding to reasons, then it is just not acceptable to choose an option 
that is less than the best because I won’t actually respond to my reasons.  
Lloyd Humberstone’s example is of a doctor in a concentration camp 
performing sadistic experiments on prisoners.  Ought the doctor to give 
his next victim an anaesthetic on the grounds that he is actually going to 
torture them, and it is better that the torture is less painful?  It seems 
obvious that he ought not to administer the anaesthetic, because he also 
ought not to be torturing the victim.  That he is going to torture the 
                                       
7 Frank Jackson, “Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest 
Objection,” Ethics vol. 101 no.3 (April 1991), 480. 
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victim anyway is not something he should consider in deciding what to 
do.8  By the same token, we might think that a predicted failure to live 
up to requirements to promote the good is neither here nor there when 
we deliberate about whether to commit ourselves to doing so. 
 
In response to this kind of objection, defenders of this view point out that 
obligations are relative to sets of options.  And while the lower standard 
might be my obligation relative to one set of options, this does not make 
it my only, or all-things-considered, obligation.9  Although I ought to 
choose the option that has the best actual outcome, this does not mean 
that I do not also have an obligation to choose the option with the best 
possible outcome and then bring about that option.  If my option set is 
                                       
8 Humberstone, “The Background of Circumstances,” 22-23. 
9 See the discussion in Jackson and Pargetter, “Oughts, Options and Actualism,” 240-
241.  The stipulative nature of option sets also allows this account to avoid the 
objection that, since the set of all options available to the agent is indefinitely large, it is 
not possible for us to know which option is the best.  The objection, put to me by Tim 
Chappell, requires a longer reply than is appropriate here; however, it does not apply to 
an account which holds that bestness/rightness holds relative to some specified option 
set.  Chappell’s concerns about stipulating options sets are (a) that this would mean 
giving up any claim that Consequentialism’s moral judgements are based upon a 
comprehensive survey of available options, and (b) that it allows the Consequentialist to 
set up option sets in such a way as to suggest the desired answer.  See Chappell, 
“Option Ranges.”  Regarding (a), my inclination is to bite the bullet.  Regarding (b), it 
seems to me that, even if this were true (of which I am unconvinced), the critic could 
remedy the situation by proposing specific alternatives to be included in the option set.  
The Consequentialist account developed here already acknowledges that what is best 
relative to one set may not be best relative to another; the question is then to determine 
if there is a ‘definitive’ option set for the purposes of evaluating the agent’s choice.  For 
more discussion of this point, see Frank Jackson, “Decision-Theoretic 
Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection,” and “On the Semantics and 
Logic of Obligation,” Mind vol. 94 no. 374 (April 1985): 177-195. 
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described as {committing myself to extreme demands; committing myself 
to modest demands}, then I ought to choose the latter because what will 
actually happen subsequent to my making that choice is better than 
what will actually happen subsequent to my choosing extreme demands.  
But if my option set consists of {committing myself to extreme demands 
and following through, committing myself to moderate demands and 
following through}, then the outcomes are already built into the choices, 
and I ought to choose the more demanding option.  So I have an 
obligation to choose the less demanding standard because that will have 
the best actual results, but I also have an obligation to choose the more 
demanding standard and follow through, because this is the best 
outcome that I can bring about.  As Jackson and Pargetter point out, “we 
must not let the mere fact that someone would not do something show 
that they could not or ought not.”10 
  
But this then seems to indicate that not only do we not have permissions 
on this account, we do not even have moderate demands.  I have not 
shown that, on the Actualist account, only the moderate demand exists: 
rather, a moderate demand has been added to the extreme demand, 
which is still there, and still demanding.11  If it is what will actually bring 
about the best consequences, then I am required, rather than permitted, 
to devote myself disproportionately to my projects and attachments.  And 
if I instead manage to meet a higher standard, this is not praiseworthy 
supererogation: in that case, the lesser obligation drops out, because it is 
not then true that I won’t actually meet the higher standard, and the 
higher standard is precisely what is required of me. 
 
                                       
10 Jackson and Pargetter, “Oughts, Options and Actualism,” 240. 
11 Thanks to Garrett Cullity for pointing this out. 
Jennie Louise 8/22/2007 
 
Page 13 of 24 
 
5.  Predictions, Probability and Agency 
 
I think that appearances here may be somewhat misleading, however.  
We need to look more closely at what it means to claim that a particular 
outcome will actually result if a certain option is chosen.  One thing this 
had better not mean is that, it is true now that, for example, I will φ later 
if I choose option X now: if this is the case, then it is hard to see how I 
can assert that it is nevertheless possible for me to ψ subsequent to 
choosing X.  Rather, the best interpretation of the claim that if I choose 
X, I will later φ, is as a prediction of the most likely outcome.  This 
prediction is made on the basis of self-knowledge, facts about the 
situation and perhaps inductive reasoning from my past behaviour. 
 
Thus, we might think that my actions subsequent to any choice should 
inform my decision via a sort of Expected Utility model.  The claim that I 
will φ if I choose option X is simply an assertion that, given the available 
facts, my φ-ing is highly probable (although it cannot be a certainty).  But 
this is certainly not a standard version of Expected Utility theory: the 
claim is not that I ought to calculate the probabilities of all possible 
outcomes of my choosing an option, then multiply by the utility each 
outcome would produce.  Rather, the claim is that the utility of the 
option is the utility of the highly likely outcome. 
 
But of course, not all options have one outcome that is highly likely.  And 
this may explain the choice of examples by each side in the debate 
concerning the legitimacy of taking into account your own future actions.  
Actualists tend to use examples in which there is a particular outcome, 
consisting of the agent’s acting in a certain way, which is much more 
likely than any other outcome, given facts about the agent’s past 
behaviour and their character and dispositions.  Possibilists, however, 
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tend to use examples in which it is not as plausible to assert that there is 
a very high probability of the agent’s subsequently acting in a particular 
way: in which there does not seem to be, for example, weakness of will, 
strong feelings or attachments, or anything else that would make it 
difficult for the agent to act for the best. 
 
The point of the objections against Actualism, however, is not to show 
that there are some cases in which the relative probabilities fail to 
support a claim about what the agent will do.  The objection is to the 
idea of using probabilities of any kind in deliberating.  The claim is, in 
other words, that it is inappropriate to appeal to probabilities as a guide 
to action, no matter how high or low.12  Indeed, we might go further and 
say that it is inappropriate even to assign probabilities to one’s own free 
future actions.  To do this is simply to ignore or deny the fact that one is 
an agent, and that the role of deliberation is to decide what one will do.  
No matter how unlikely any given outcome, if I can bring it about, a 
decision to do so might render these probabilities irrelevant.  I cannot, in 
other words, treat my own actions as merely another empirical 
phenomenon to be predicted, because agency confounds the assignment 
of probabilities to outcomes which are constituted (even partly) by one’s 
own actions. 
 
In fact, there are two possible ways to make this claim.  One is that, 
although probabilities can be assigned to my possible future actions, it is 
inappropriate to pay attention to them in my decision-making.  A second, 
stronger, form of the objection is that the fact of my agency renders 
probability assignments impossible, at least from my own perspective.  
                                       
12 The exception is of course where that probability is 1 (or 0); this is acknowledged to 
be relevant to deliberation by Possibilists as well as Actualists. 
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Either of these claims will support the argument that I cannot use a 
prediction about my own future actions to justify my choice of a less 
good course of action.  According to the weaker claim, although it is 
highly probable that I will act in a particular way subsequent to a choice, 
I should not consider this fact in deciding which choice is best.  
According to the stronger, claim, it is not even true that my acting a 
particular way has a determinate probability. 
 
I think that there is something to these objections.  It does seem 
incompatible with one’s concept of oneself as an agent to adopt a 
predictive stance towards oneself.  As Richard Moran writes, 
what is wrong with the ‘direction of gaze’ here, the shift to the 
theoretical or empirical perspective, is that it suggests that [one’s] 
reflection on [one’s] best reasons for belief or action still leave it an 
open question what [one] will actually end up believing or doing.  
This is not a stable position one can occupy and still conceive of 
oneself as a practical and theoretical deliberator.  One must see 
one’s deliberation as the expression and development of one’s belief 
and will, not as an activity one pursues in the hope that it will have 
some influence on one’s eventual belief and will.”13 
  
On the other hand, there are some circumstances in which we do not 
think that an agent ought to ignore a high probability that they will act a 
certain way; nor is it plausible to deny that their acting this way is highly 
probable.  If my past decisions to φ have always met with failure, and 
there is nothing different about my current situation, then it doesn’t 
seem that I should treat my present decision to φ as if it will succeed 
unproblematically.  Moran illustrates this with the example of Sartre’s 
gambler, who resolves to stop gambling but who also knows that he will 
most likely fail to do so.  As Moran writes, “A certain ‘realism’ demands 
                                       
13 Richard Moran, Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge (Princeton 
University Press, 2001), 94. 
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that he acknowledge that, in his current condition, his ‘decision’ to quit 
does not fully answer the question of what he is actually going to do . . . . 
He must see his current decision and his empirical history as each 
delivering incompatible answers to the question of what he is going to do 
. . . . Yet, he must also see that he cannot simply dismiss the claims of 
either perspective.”14 
 
Regarding the weak claim, this seems to mean that some attention to 
probabilities is warranted in cases where there is strong evidence in 
favour of a particular outcome.  Regarding the strong claim, it seems that 
some assignment of probability is possible, albeit only of a very coarse-
grained kind.  Where the rough probability of a particular outcome is 
obvious (very likely, highly unlikely), it may be appropriate for an agent to 
allow this fact to influence their deliberations.  And yet, predictions 
about one’s future actions can never be substituted entirely for 
deliberation on the basis of what one is capable of doing as an agent. 
 
6.  Probability and Permissions 
 
So what does this have to do with extreme demands?  What we are 
looking for is an account of requirements to promote the good that 
permit, but do not require, sacrifices beyond a given level, and that also 
permit, but do not require, a life in which I devote my resources 
disproportionately to my own projects and relationships.  I have claimed 
that, in deliberating about demands to promote the good, it is not 
legitimate to ignore my predictions about what other agents will do.  As 
far as my own actions are concerned, although I cannot take a stance 
                                       
14 Moran, 162. 
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that is merely predictive, I also cannot ignore predictive information 
when it is very strong and well-grounded. 
 
In the case of demands to promote the good, I can choose to adopt a 
course of action involving extreme sacrifice, or to adopt a course of action 
involving more moderate sacrifice.  Given everything I know about myself 
and my past behaviour, as well as my knowledge of human nature in 
general, it seems that I ought to take into account in my deliberations 
the overwhelming likelihood that I won’t manage to follow through on a 
more demanding commitment.  However, it would not do to suppose that 
I should attempt to calculate the exact probabilities of my carrying out 
various courses of action subsequent to my choice.  As we have seen, it 
is disputable whether the calculation of such probabilities is even 
possible, and even if it is, this is not a perspective that I can take while 
still regarding myself as an agent deliberating about what to do. 
 
How, then, ought we to take predictions about our own actions into 
account?  My suggestion is that, in considering the value of my options, I 
ought to discount the value of each option in a way that is 
commensurate with my rough estimate of the probability that the best 
outcome will occur.  But the perspective of agency probably precludes 
anything other than a very crude estimate: in general, the stronger the 
evidence that I will not succeed, the more I should discount the value of 
that option, but I will not be able to say precisely how much.  So from the 
agent’s own point of view, the value of their options will not be able to be 
precisely determined.  And if this is correct, we may after all be able to 
account for permissions regarding promoting the good. 
 
It has in fact long been recognised that permissions can be generated 
within neutral-value-promoting frameworks: a permission is generated 
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whenever an option set contains two options that are equally good, and 
(jointly) better than all of the other options in the set.  If I cannot choose 
both, I am permitted to choose either.  This kind of permission, however, 
has usually been regarded as trivial and not of any practical importance, 
since such cases will arise only very rarely, and certainly will not occur 
in relation to beneficence: almost all parties to the debate agree that the 
neutral value of my living a life of great sacrifice is much greater than the 
neutral value of my living a life of moderate sacrifice. 
 
Even when we take probabilities into account, it does not seem that a 
permission will be generated.  It may bring the values of the two options 
closer to one another: the overall value of choosing the life of moderate 
sacrifice (moderate value, with a high probability of its occurrence) may 
not be vastly different to the overall value of choosing the life of great 
sacrifice (very high value, with a very low probability of its occurrence).  
But unless they are exactly the same, permissions will not be generated; 
rather, what will result is still a requirement to choose a particular 
option. 
 
This, however, is where the inability to precisely specify probabilities or 
expected utilities becomes useful.  What I have claimed in the preceding 
discussion is that requirements to promote the good are the kind of 
requirements for which I ought to take into account the likelihood of my 
failure to meet extreme demands.  But because I cannot assign anything 
more than very rough probabilities to the relevant outcomes, the 
adjusted value of my options will likewise only be able to be specified in a 
very rough way.  And this means that, in a wide range of cases, I will not 
be able to make a judgement about whether one option is better than the 
other.  And if I cannot differentiate between the value of the options, I do 
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not have a basis for choosing one rather than the other.  What I would 
like to suggest is that this will give me a permission to choose either. 
 
My account therefore implies that permissions regarding promotion of 
the good arise from the interaction of two factors: firstly, the robustness 
of the empirical facts regarding what I will in fact do subsequent to 
choosing a course of action, which makes it appropriate for me to 
consider these facts in deliberation.  The second factor is my inability to 
take these facts into account in anything other than a very vague way, so 
that the value assigned to my options is approximate.  This is consistent 
with both the weak and strong claims above: according to the weak 
claim, I cannot put myself in a position to determine probabilities 
without undermining my status as a deliberating agent.  According to the 
strong claim, I cannot assign more than approximate value because it is 
not possible to determine probabilities regarding my own actions.  Either 
way, my inability to determine which option is better than the other, 
when the value of each is adjusted by the likelihood of my realising it, 
results in a permission to do either. 
 
There are a few nice features of this account.  Firstly, it does not rely 
upon any form of the appeal to cost, or any claim that agents are allowed 
to assign a disproportionate weight to the value of their own projects and 
attachments in their decision making.  Secondly, it gives a kind of 
explanation for why we think that adopting a life of extreme sacrifice is 
praiseworthy.  The successful choice of such a life shows that the agent 
has been able to transcend the empirical facts about their character and 
past patterns of behaviour; it involves taking oneself seriously as an 
agent, and the exercise of considerable willpower and self-control.  But 
the praiseworthiness of this course of action does not show that all 
agents should ignore the empirical evidence and embark upon 
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demanding courses of action based only upon the possibilities presented 
by their agency. 
 
7.  Objections and Problems 
 
The argument I have presented above is fairly broad and lacking in 
detail; and a number of problems still need to be sorted out before 
deciding whether the theory is viable.  In this section I will mention some 
potential objections.  Some of these are fairly easily answered; others are 
more difficult, and more work will be required to determine their 
significance. 
 
One argument which might be made against this theory is that, as an 
elaboration upon the Actualist account, it suffers from pretty much the 
same problem as Actualism: namely, that it imposes a moral standard 
that is far too lenient.  For example, why assume that any given agent is 
highly likely to follow through on a commitment to a life of moderate 
sacrifice?  Would this account not generate a permission for me to do 
nothing at all to help others, on the grounds that I am so lazy and selfish 
that the probability of my doing anything more is very low?  On the other 
hand, much more could be demanded of someone who is not captive to 
their dispositions: if there is not a strong probability that I will fail, the 
more demanding option will obviously be better, and I will be required to 
choose it. 
 
I think that my account will lead to stronger demands being placed on 
those whose decisions are generally more efficacious in producing the 
decided-upon outcomes.  It also does not seem that there will be a bright 
line between cases in which it will be appropriate to appeal to predictive 
facts, and cases in which it will not.  Rather, the boundary of 
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permissions will be rather vague.  But there is probably a level of ability 
to render one’s decisions effective that is a minimum standard for 
considering someone an agent at all.  Anyone who is genuinely an agent 
cannot plausibly assert that a decision to do even a minimal amount to 
help others would not be efficacious. 
 
Another line of argument here would be to claim that the legitimacy of 
making assumptions about one’s future actions is dependent on the 
existence of very strong empirical evidence, not only about oneself, but 
also about normal human agents.  That is, if a normal agent would have 
no problem in following through on a particular commitment, it will not 
be legitimate for any individual agent to deliberate on the basis of a 
prediction that they will have a problem following through on that 
commitment.  This would block appeals to my laziness and selfishness to 
generate too-generous permissions, while also retaining the moderate-
sacrifice permission, for it is obviously very difficult for normal agents to 
successfully commit to a life of extreme sacrifice.  This line of argument 
would require much more work, since the question of what normal 
agents would or would not succeed in doing is likely to be a difficult and 
complex issue. I will not offer any general principles or solutions here.  
However, I will submit that if there is any case in which the evidence for 
predictions about normal human agents is strong, it is that of promoting 
the welfare of distant strangers. 
 
An objector might point out that there is another aspect to the problem 
they have presented: there may be some cases in which the empirical 
evidence about one’s future actions is so strong, and so much rides on 
the outcome, that it may be clear that taking the second-best option is 
better, thus resulting in a requirement to do this rather than a 
permission.  In such cases it would be wrong to choose the perspective of 
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agency.  For example, suppose I am considering making a commitment 
to donate my life savings to a particular charity in order to save people 
from some natural disaster.  As a result of my commitment, the charity 
would consider its fundraising objectives met, and would stop soliciting 
donations, so that if I did not in fact follow through on my commitment, 
many people would die due to the delay in calling for more money.  If I 
have extremely good reason to believe that I will not in fact live up to my 
commitment, then it would, on this account, be wrong for me to make it.  
But I submit that this is in fact a fairly plausible claim.  The more that is 
at stake in any decision, the less defensible it is to take risks. 
 
I believe, then, that the first objection will not prove fatal to my position.  
However, a more important issue for my account is the question of 
objective permissions.  The account I have given is one of subjective 
permissions, since it relies on the impossibility or inappropriateness of 
making predictions about one’s own behaviour.  But the same problems 
do not exist regarding predictions about the behaviour of other agents: as 
we have seen, we should take these into account in our own 
deliberations.  Indeed, Jackson and Pargetter try to support their claims 
about Actualism by asking us to consider what advice a third party 
would give in cases where the probability of my acting a certain way is 
high.15  But if a third party can take a purely predictive stance, then 
probability assignments are also appropriate from the third-person 
perspective.  And even though they may not be very precise, they will be 
more precise than those that can be given by the agent themselves.  And 
this means that there will be a large range of cases in which a 
comparison between the value of options is possible from a third-person 
perspective even though it is not possible or appropriate from a first-
                                       
15 Jackson and Pargetter, “Oughts, Options and Actualism,” 237. 
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person perspective.  In these cases there will be subjective permissions 
but not objective permissions. 
 
I am not entirely sure what to say to this objection, or indeed how much 
of a threat it is to my account.  But I think that, when we are talking 
about demands to promote the good, the first-person stance is most 
relevant for the simple reason that I am deliberating about what I ought 
to do.  A third-person perspective, in which the probability of my 
following through is more easily determined, will often result in an 
objective requirement for me to adopt the second-best option.  But from 
my own perspective as an agent, these probabilities, and hence the 
requirement resulting from them, does not seem relevant to my choice.  
It does seem clear, however, that any further development of this account 
will have to incorporate a more detailed solution to this problem. 
 
 
8.  Conclusion 
 
Accounts of demands to promote the good have tended to overlook the 
role that probabilities play in determining our obligations.  Indeed, to 
some extent, the opposite extreme has been the case: our ability as 
agents to bring about any possible outcome through decision has 
obscured the need to concentrate upon our limitations.  It is a tricky and 
delicate question exactly how seriously we ought to take these 
limitations: if we take them too seriously, we are not trying hard enough 
and are denying our agency, but if we don’t take them seriously enough, 
we are just being irresponsible. 
 
What I have tried to argue for here is the claim that, where demands to 
promote the good are concerned, the perspective of agency and the 
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perspective of prediction are equally legitimate, given the difficulties of 
assigning precise probabilities to the outcomes involved.  It is true that 
we can do better if we try; on the other hand, everything we know about 
ourselves and about the behaviour of human agents in general suggests 
that this is highly unlikely.  Given these facts, and the much higher 
probability of succeeding in doing less, it would seem equally good – 
roughly – not to do the best we can. 
 
 
